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ALASKA’S JUDICIAL RETENTION
ELECTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
ALBERT J. KLUMPP*
ABSTRACT
The results of recent judicial retention elections in Alaska, and the recent
increase in political activities related to judicial selection in Alaska and many
other states, have given rise to concerns about the fates of future Alaska
retention candidates. This Article analyzes the results of retention elections
nationwide and suggests that there may be good reason for Alaska judges to be
worried. Baseline levels of voter support for retention candidates in most of
Alaska are among the lowest in the country, and have gradually been declining
over time. In addition, Alaskan voters have targeted individual judges for
removal more frequently than voters in most other states. This Article’s
analysis indicates that ensuring the retention of competent Alaska judges in
the future requires more than simply improving the effectiveness of proretention campaigns for individual candidates, and that understanding and
addressing deeply held voter attitudes must be part of a more comprehensive
effort.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2017, as part of its annual convention, the Alaska Bar hosted
a CLE program that may well have been the first of its kind anywhere in
the United States. The program—”The Changing National Landscape in
Judicial Retention and its Implications for Alaska”—was essentially a
how-to guide for dealing with judicial retention elections and the
opposition that can arise against a judge seeking retention.1 It addressed
ethical issues and conflict-of-interest questions facing retention
candidates and potential supporters and opponents, discussed the extent
to which judges can campaign on their own behalf and solicit outside
assistance, and shared stories of successful retention campaigns and the
strategies that those campaigns employed.2
The program was a result of concerns over two recent events. One
was a 2014 attempt to enact an amendment to the state constitution’s
judicial article.3 The amendment would have drastically altered the
Alaska Judicial Council, giving the state’s governor the power to appoint
the majority of its members and thus greatly expand the governor’s
influence over the selection of new judges.4 The proposal fell just short of
passage in the state senate, and while its near-term prospects for adoption
have faded substantially,5 the opposition effort that it generated continues
to remain active.6 In fact, the CLE program itself was produced by Justice
Not Politics Alaska, a citizen organization that was formed in the wake of
the proposal and that continues to advocate in favor of the current judicial
selection system.7
1. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Panel Discussion at the Alaska Bar Association
2017 Annual Convention: The Changing National Landscape in Judicial Retention
and its Implication for Alaska (May 10, 2017).
2. See generally Audio recording: Conference on The Changing National
Landscape in Judicial Retention and its Implications for Alaska, held by the
Alaska Bar Association (May 10, 2017) [hereinafter CLE Program recording on
Judicial Retention] (on file with author).
3. S.J.R. 21, 28th Leg., 2d. Sess. (Alaska 2014).
4. See Michael L. Boyer, The State Courts and Alaska Politics: Independence,
Public Accountability, and Political Influence, in ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE DYNAMICS OF BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND POWER, 605, 619−20
(Clive S. Thomas et al. eds., 2016) (describing proposed amendment).
5. CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2.
6. See Dermot Cole, Senate Scraps Plan to Double Governor’s Picks on Council
for Judge Nominees,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr.
12,
2014),
https://www.adn.com/politics/article/senate-withdraws-plan-give-governormore-influence-picking-alaska-judges/2014/04/13/ (noting opponents of
amendment, many of whom are still important stakeholders as of this writing);
see also CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2, at 2:05.
7. Robert Woolsey, Lawyers Advocate to Keep Politics Out of Judge Selection,
KCAW (Sep. 17, 2015), https://www.kcaw.org/2015/09/17/lawyers-advocateto-keep-politics-out-of-judge-selection/.
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The other event of concern was the 2016 Alaska general election,
specifically the low voter approval rates for judicial retention candidates.8
Walter “Bud” Carpeneti, former chief justice of the Alaska Supreme
Court, summarized this concern in his introductory remarks at the CLE
program:
In the 2016 election cycle, some results in Alaska’s judicial
retention elections caused many observers to wonder if our
constitutional merit system is vulnerable to the possibility that
coordinated non-retention campaigns against competent and
qualified sitting judges could be successful, and that we may be
close to losing the services of some really good and fair judges
for reasons that have nothing to do with judicial merit.9
As its title indicates, the CLE program was predicated on the idea of
a “changing national landscape” that has altered the playing field upon
which retention elections are conducted. To support this idea, program
panelists discussed Supreme Court cases that have significantly impacted
the conduct of retention campaigns and the financing of judicial
elections.10 In addition, panelists presented and discussed evidence
showing recent increases in campaign spending in both contested and
retention elections, 11 as well as increases in attempts by state legislatures
to eliminate judicial merit selection or otherwise reduce the independence
of state courts.12
However, the program did not fully explore one important topic: the
actual results of retention elections. It offered a few summary statistics
and touched upon recent high-profile retention controversies, but, due to
its time and content limitations, it was unable to offer a comprehensive
picture of election results or thoroughly assess whether or not retention
voting patterns have shifted in recent years. This omits an important piece
8. See generally ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1976 – 2016 RETENTION VOTE
HISTORY (2016), www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/
retvotes16.pdf (showing a median approval rate of 61.2% in 2016 Alaska judicial
retention election).
9. CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2.
10. Id. at 15:20 (discussing Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002), where the Court held that Minnesota’s canon of judicial conduct
prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing position on disputed
legal or political issues violated the First Amendment; Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010), striking down restricting corporate political speech; and Kansas v.
Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016), where Justice Scalia speculated at oral argument that
Kansans might vote against retaining state supreme court justices who did not
support death penalty).
11. Id. at 21:00 (discussing trends in retention campaign spending between
2009 and 2014).
12. Id. at 26:30 (highlighting Kansas state legislature’s efforts to reform
courts).
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of the overall picture, because the extent to which a retention candidate is
at risk of removal in any single election depends fundamentally on the
baseline level of support that a jurisdiction’s electorate gives its retention
candidates in general.
This Article will examine the results of retention elections in Alaska
and nationwide, in order to assess the risk that Alaska’s retention
candidates face and determine whether that risk is increasing. It will first
present a national overview of past retention elections, and then will
compare Alaska’s election results to those of the other retention states.
Since Alaska is the only U.S. state to have employed the retention election
method continuously since statehood, a comparative analysis of this kind
has important implications not just for Alaska, but also for many other
states where the debate over judicial selection methods is less settled.
The data set used in this analysis has its origins in a 2005 doctoral
dissertation that studied voting patterns in urban jurisdictions with long
retention ballots. As the result of subsequent, ongoing research and datagathering through election websites, historical archives, government
agencies and other sources, the data set now encompasses nearly the
entire retention voting history of the United States, including all of the
state-level trial and appellate courts in all of the retention states.

I. RETENTION ELECTIONS NATIONWIDE
Judicial retention elections were first proposed during the
Progressive Era, a time when local political machines were able to exert
considerable control over judicial systems.13 Reformers advocated a
procedure under which councils of sitting judges would select new
individuals to fill judicial vacancies by appointment, and the public
would decide the fate of incumbents through a thumbs-up-thumbs-down
vote without challengers.14 Such a system, the reformers argued, would
minimize the influence of party politics over the judiciary while retaining
a measure of accountability to the electorate.15
The nation’s first retention elections were held in California in 1936,
two years after the state’s voters approved a constitutional change to
allow for retention elections for all appellate courts.16 Missouri followed
13. See SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 1−3 (1980); see also ALBERT KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 225–52 (1914) (overviewing methods of selecting judges);
Albert Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y
BULL., 1914, at 29–52 (same).
14. CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 13, at 1–3.
15. Id.
16. Gerald F. Uelmen, California Judicial Retention Elections, 28 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 333, 334−40, 344 (1988).
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in 1942, debuting retention elections for all appellate courts and for most
trial courts in the St. Louis and Kansas City regions. This reform was part
of a comprehensive judicial selection plan known now commonly as the
Missouri Plan,17 which Alaska uses today. Today there are twenty-two
U.S. states in which at least some judges stand for retention in
noncompetitive elections. Table 1 lists the states and the extent to which
retention elections are used in each state.
Table 1. Use of Retention Elections in U.S. States
Appellate courts only: California, Florida, Maryland, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee
All state courts: Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Montana*,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wyoming
Appellate courts and some trial courts: Arizona, Indiana, Kansas,
Missouri
Local courts of limited jurisdiction: Colorado (county), Georgia
(Atlanta Municipal), Idaho (county), Kansas (county), Montana*
(county), Nebraska (municipal, juvenile), New Mexico (Bernalillo
County), Pennsylvania (Philadelphia Municipal and Traffic Courts),
Utah (Justice Courts)
*Unopposed judges only
All of the states except two require the approval of either 50% or a
simple majority of participating voters to win retention. Illinois requires
60%18 and New Mexico requires 57%.19
As of 2017, a total of 14,418 retention elections have taken place for
state trial and appellate judges in our nation’s history. More than 3000
additional elections have been held for local courts of limited jurisdiction.
Table 2 presents summary figures on the state-court retentions.

17. Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 2005,
72 MO. L. REV. 199, 202 (2007).
18. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7A-1 (WEST 2017).
19. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 33(A).
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Table 2. Historical Retention Election Totals by State

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Wyoming
TOTALS

First Year
of
Retention
Elections
1962
1976
1936
1970
1978
1964
1972
1964
1960
1978
1942
1974
1964
1990
1968
1969
1984
1974
1970
1974

Number of
Candidates
449
1078
698
1065
432
2671
226
1617
1030
96
1288
213
903
346
187
1044
20
189
584
282
14,418

Number
of
Removals
5
3
3
13
0
29
2
7
1
0
3
0
7
5
0
18
0
1
2
6
105

Removal
Rate
1.11%
0.28%
0.43%
1.22%
0.00%
1.09%
0.88%
0.43%
0.10%
0.00%
0.23%
0.00%
0.78%
1.45%
0.00%
1.72%
0.00%
0.53%
0.34%
2.13%
0.73%

Note: Does not include local courts of limited jurisdiction.
As the table illustrates, removals in retention elections are extremely
rare occurrences, with more than 99% of judges winning retention.
Retention rates in local courts likewise exceed 99%.
Not only are removals infrequent, but they have become more
infrequent in recent years. Table 3 reports the removal rates for state court
judges nationwide by decade. It shows that fewer judges have been
removed since 2000 than in earlier decades.
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Table 3. Retention Election Defeats by Decade

pre-1970
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009
2010-2016

Candidates
688
1647
2513
3127
3568
2875

Defeats
2
20
25
34
13
11

Rate
0.29%
1.21%
0.99%
1.09%
0.36%
0.38%

Moreover, although not shown in the table, more than two-thirds of
the thirty-four retention defeats in the 1990s occurred between 1990 and
1992. So in the past quarter-century, removals have been much less
common than during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.
The most important and consequential retention elections are those
of supreme court justices and other statewide judges, so those election
results warrant a more detailed examination. The data for statewide
judges reveals a removal rate that is slightly higher than the removal rate
for trial court judges, but not substantially so. A total of eleven state
supreme court justices have been removed out of the 809 who have sought
retention since 1936, a rate of 1.36%. One defeat occurred in 1964;20 three
in 1986;21 three in the 1990s;22 one in 2005;23 and three in 2010.24
Beyond simple counts of successes and failures, much more can be
learned by examining variations in approval rates, since approval rates
can show changes over time and across jurisdictions with more
sensitivity. Figure 1 charts the approval rates for statewide judges in the
nineteen retention states that elect at least some judges statewide. Each
line represents the approval rates in a single state, and each data point
represents the median approval rate for all statewide judges on the same

20. Randy M. Olsen, Harry O. Arend: Alaska Bar Controversy Claims First Judge,
ALASKA BAR ASS’N, https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/bar_
controversy_claims_harry_arend_s_judgeship_at_statehood.html (last visited
October 13, 2017).
21. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California
Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348, 349–55 (1987).
22. See generally Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons
From the Defeats of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70−72 (1999);
Marilyn S. Kite, Wyoming’s Judicial Selection Process: Is It Getting the Job Done? 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 214−25 (2007).
23. Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, Lessons From an Unusual Retention
Election, 43 CT. REV. 6, 6−7 (2006).
24. Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715, 716−18 (2011).
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ballot. Using medians allows for a broader overview of general rates and
trends and reduces the impact of controversies involving individual
judges (which are addressed separately below).
Figure 1 reveals three important characteristics about retention
voting. First, baseline levels of support for judges vary widely among
states. In some states, judges are routinely supported by 80% or more of
the electorate, while approval is barely above 60% in other states. While
retention elections have long been perceived as a guarantee of lifetime
employment for judges, Figure 1 makes clear that judges in some states
are much more vulnerable to removal than in others.
Second, during the 1970s there was a gradual decline in baseline
approval rates. This decline is easier to see in trial-court data sets, which
offer more jurisdictions and more candidates to study. But in most of the
states employing retention elections throughout the 1970s, approval rates
were lower at the end of the decade than at the beginning—in some cases
by nearly double-digit margins—and have never fully recovered.
Subsequent research noted a parallel between this decline and a
decline in “political trust” as defined by questions on a periodic
nationwide opinion poll.25 Unfortunately, specific polling about judicial
elections has always been extremely rare. There are no known data
sources from those years that could help determine whether or not any of
the 1970s decline was specific to attitudes towards the judiciary.
Third, retention voting appears to be heavily dependent on at least
one particular aspect of voter attitude towards government: support for
incumbents. In the 1990 election, a grassroots anti-incumbent campaign
against the U.S. Congress ended up having a huge spillover effect on
incumbents at all levels of government, with incumbents defeated in
unprecedented numbers nationwide.26 Similar feelings were prevalent in

25. See Larry T. Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83
JUDICATURE 79 (1999) (illustrating a positive correlation between political trust and
affirmative vote in judicial retention elections); see also Larry T. Aspin et al., Thirty
Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4–5 (2000).
26. See Albert J. Klumpp, Judicial Retention Elections in Cook County:
Exercise of Democracy, or Exercise in Futility? 111–21, 160 (Mar. 1, 2005)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with the
University of Illinois at Chicago Library).
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2010, this time for more partisan reasons. Major polls measured strong
anti-incumbent sentiment, and an unusual number of congressional
incumbents lost their seats.27
Figure 1 shows sudden, noticeable drops in support for retention
judges nationwide in both 1990 and 2010 that coincide with the antiincumbent attitudes and events in those years. Again, specific polling
data on judicial voting is not available to link these drops to a specific
cause. But given that retention candidates are the most easily identifiable
incumbents on most election ballots, and given that no alternative
explanation has ever emerged for the sudden approval rate shifts in either
year, there is a strong basis for connecting anti-incumbent sentiment with
these judicial retention voting events.
The bottom line remains that the defeat of a retention candidate is a
rare occurrence. But in light of the fact that so much variation exists from
place to place and over time, does Alaska’s retention history suggest that
its current judges are facing any unusual risk of removal?

II. ALASKA RETENTION ELECTION RESULTS AND THE
VULNERABILITY OF ALASKA CANDIDATES
The most important aspect of Alaska’s retention history is an
exceptionally low level of electoral support for judges. Table 4 is based on
the same data used in Figure 1 above, and compares the same U.S. states.
The table reports median approval rates for statewide retention
candidates over the past twenty years. Of the nineteen states in the table,
Alaska’s median approval rating ranks lowest with a 63.4% median rate.

27. Gary Langer, Poll: 2010 Midterm Elections: Incumbent Support Lowest Since
1994, ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/2010_
Elections/poll-2010_Elections/poll-2010-midterm-elections-incumbent-supportlowest-1994/story?id=10487480 (focusing on results of an ABC NewsWashington Post poll suggesting anti-incumbent sentiment ahead of 2010 midterm elections); Ryan McClafferty, What Will the “Anti-Incumbent Frenzy” Mean for
2010?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2010/02/what-will-the-anti-incumbent-frenzy-mean-for-2010/36345/
(considering high anti-incumbent sentiment in advance of 2010 midterm
elections); see generally Drew DeSilver, Public’s Anti-Incumbent Mood Hasn’t Always
Predicted Big Electoral Swings, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/05/publics-anti-incumbentmood-hasn’t-always-predicted-big-electoral-swings/ (discussing levels of antiincumbent attitudes in recent years and the defeats of fifty-eight House of
Representatives incumbents in 2010).
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Table 4. Median Approval Rates,
Statewide Retention Judges 1996–2016
Maryland
South Dakota
Montana
Utah
Wyoming
Arizona
New Mexico
Nebraska
Iowa
Pennsylvania
Kansas
Colorado
Tennessee
Indiana
California
Florida
Missouri
Oklahoma
Alaska

85.5%
82.2%
80.9%
80.8%
78.2%
76.4%
73.9%
72.8%
72.7%
71.9%
71.6%
71.4%
71.3%
71.2%
70.2%
67.8%
67.6%
66.5%
63.4%

Note: Illinois does not have any statewide retention elections.
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Table 5 provides a more complete picture of Alaska’s retention
results. It reports median approval rates for all retention candidates for
both appellate and trial courts, separated by district and by decade. The
table reveals two important facts. First, approval rates vary somewhat
across the state, with northern and southern voters supporting candidates
at higher rates than in the Anchorage and Fairbanks districts. Differences
of this sort are not uncommon, particularly in larger states where different
regions can have different political climates.
Table 5. Median Approval Rates by Judicial District and Decade
Judicial District
3
4
(Anchorage) (Fairbanks)

1
(Juneau)

2
(Northern)

76.8%

86.0%

72.8%

73.0%

67.5%

19801988

72.4%

74.7%

66.3%

68.4%

66.1%

19901998

73.2%

72.8%

64.9%

67.5%

64.8%

20002008

75.1%

67.4%

66.5%

70.3%

63.8%

20102016

74.6%

72.8%

62.4%

66.0%

60.5%

Years
19621978

Appellate
(Statewide)

Table 5 also reveals a general decline in approval rates over time,
most noticeably for statewide judges. While not consistent across all
districts and decades, overall the state’s retention candidates are receiving
lower approval rates than in the past. As noted above, approval rates
declined in most states during the 1970s, but Table 5 suggests a continuing
decline in Alaska that is not occurring in most other states.
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In the last thirty years, only two Alaska judges have been removed
in retention elections, and both were exceptional cases involving not only
negative performance evaluations but also negative media coverage
pertaining to professional misconduct.28 Nevertheless, the figures in
Tables 4 and 5 show that Alaska judges and their supporters have good
reason for concern. Because the state’s baseline approval rates are at such
low levels and show a sustained decline over time, Alaskan retention
candidates are more vulnerable to removal than candidates in other
retention states for reasons that may have little or nothing to do with their
performance.
The type of anti-incumbent surge described above is just one factor
that becomes a greater concern in Alaska as approval rates decline. Based
on the magnitudes of the shifts in Alaska in 1990 and 2010, and on the
figures in Table 5, a similar event occurring in 2018 would not in itself
cause the removal of any judges. But particularly for statewide judges and
judges in the Anchorage and Fairbanks districts, the danger will grow
over time if approval rates continue to decrease.
Another type of negative surge that can occur in retention voting is
a protest vote against an entire state judicial system because of a highprofile supreme court controversy. For the most part, controversies
involving individual retention candidates have little or no effect on
approval rates for other candidates sharing the same ballots. On several
occasions, though, a contentious issue involving a state supreme court
produced a substantial scorched-earth vote in a subsequent election that
impacted not only the supreme court retention candidates on the ballot
but also all of the lower-court candidates as well. Most notably, this
phenomenon occurred in California in 1966, after a court decision striking
down a property rights initiative,29 and in Iowa in 2010, after a decision
that legalized gay marriage in the state.30 In both instances, all of the
retention candidates in the following retention election received
significantly lower approval rates than expected based on previous
elections. A similar vote occurred in Pennsylvania in 2005 after the state
legislature approved a substantial pay raise for state judges and other
government officials that had been proposed by the supreme court’s chief
28. See Matt Volz, Panel Comes Down Hard Against Judge, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1; Matt Volz, Judicial Commission Charges Kenai Judge with
Misconduct, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Oct. 1, 2006), http://juneauempire.com/stories/
100106/sta_20061001001.shtml#.Wey1P4Zrw1I; Megan Holland, Ethics Complaint
Filed Against Judge, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, May 5, 2010, at A3; Patti Epler, Ousted
Anchorage Judge Sues Courts, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010),
https://www.adn.com/anchorage/article/ousted-anchorage-judge-suescourts/2010/12/08/.
29. Wold & Culver, supra note 21, at 349–55.
30. Pettys, supra note 24, 716−18.
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justice.31 In none of these three instances were any lower-court candidates
removed from the bench, but this was in part because the baseline
approval rates in their jurisdictions were much higher than those in
Alaska. In short, Alaska’s low approval rates leave all of its retention
candidates particularly vulnerable to political controversies that involve
the judiciary.
Low Alaska approval rates have similar consequences for targeted
votes against specific judges. In general, there are three categories of
events that will cause voters to target a particular retention candidate for
removal: an anti-retention campaign; a negative assessment from a bar
association, newspaper, or government commission that evaluates
candidates; or a disclosure of unfavorable information about a judge’s
personal life or professional conduct that occurs close enough to election
day for voters to remember it. The history of retention elections provides
numerous examples of all three categories.32 As it turns out, the subject of
targeted retention voting is of particular importance in Alaska. In part,
this is because the state’s low baseline approval rates increase the
likelihood that a targeted vote of a given magnitude will result in
removal. But there is also the matter of frequency—how likely it is that a
judge will be targeted at all. Historical data can shed light on that
question.

III. DOUBLE-DIGIT SPREADS IN ALASKA RETENTION VOTING
An extremely useful metric in studying retention voting is the
“double-digit spread.” A double-digit spread occurs when the approval
rates of two judges on the same retention ballot differ by ten percentage
points or more. It also occurs when the approval rates of a single judge or
entire group of judges on a ballot differ from expected rates by ten
percentage points or more (based on rates in previous and subsequent
elections). The metric is useful any targeted voting on a retention voting
is almost always negative. It is exceedingly rare for any individual
retention candidate to receive significantly more positive votes than other
judges on the same ballot. Accordingly, identifying and studying
instances of double-digit spreads provides insight into targeted voting
against retention candidates, regardless of whether or not the targeted
candidate was removed.

31. Goodman & Marks, supra note 23, at 8–9.
32. See, e.g., Klumpp, supra note 26, at 143–55, 181–82, 190, 197–99.
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Table 6 displays the frequency of double-digit spreads in retention
states. The states are listed from highest to lowest in frequency. Alaska
ranks second-highest of the twenty states with a rate of 6%, indicating that
its retention candidates are among the most frequently targeted by voters
for removal.
Table 6. Frequency of Double-Digit Spreads in Retention Elections

Arizona
Alaska
Wyoming
Illinois
Pennsylvania
California
South Dakota
Colorado
New Mexico
Nebraska
Montana
Kansas
Iowa
Indiana
Missouri
Tennessee
Utah
Oklahoma
Florida
Maryland

Retention
Candidates
1078
449
282
2671
1044
698
20
1065
346
903
213
1030
1617
226
1288
189
584
187
432
96

DoubleDigit
Spreads
68
27
16
150
58
36
1
44
14
26
6
29
30
4
18
2
6
1
0
0

Rate
6.3%
6.0%
5.7%
5.6%
5.6%
5.2%
5.0%
4.1%
4.0%
2.9%
2.8%
2.8%
1.9%
1.8%
1.4%
1.1%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.0%

Alaska is exceptional not only for its frequency of double-digit
spreads but also for their causes. As might be expected, some of the
spreads were caused by performance ratings. Twelve of the twenty-seven
Alaska spreads can be linked at least in part to negative ratings by the
Alaska Judicial Council, or by bar associations in the years before the
Council’s inception. Remarkably though, most of the others were the
result of anti-retention campaigns, notwithstanding positive Alaska Bar
Association or Alaska Judicial Council ratings. The only other state in
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which anti-retention campaigns have had such a frequent impact is
Pennsylvania—and unlike any of the other retention states, Pennsylvania
holds its retention elections in odd-numbered years—when there are
many fewer offices and issues competing for the electorate’s attention.33
In addition to campaigns that produced double-digit spreads,
biennial reports produced by the Alaska Judicial Council have noted
instances of other campaigns that have had smaller electoral impacts and
that were partly or fully neutralized by counter-campaigns.34 A
comprehensive historical catalog of anti-retention campaigns does not yet
exist from which to cite figures on numbers of campaigns, but it suffices
to say that Alaska is highly unusual in the frequency of campaigns against
the retention of judges, especially trial court judges.

CONCLUSION
Is there in fact a “changing national landscape” that has placed
Alaska’s judicial retention candidates in greater peril of removal than in
the past? In many ways, yes. Particularly at the supreme court level, there
have been more frequent efforts in recent years to remove more judges in
more states. Campaign laws have changed, wealthy contributors and
special interests are more involved than in the past, and campaign
spending in supreme court retention elections is steadily increasing.35 In
retention elections, more judges find themselves having to campaign or
organize campaigns on their behalf, if only as a preemptive measure.
Nevertheless, there has not been a significant change in the outcomes
of retention elections nationally. Removals remain rare and in fact are
rarer than in the past.36 The baseline approval rates in most of the
retention states have also remained relatively stable.37 Similarly, the
frequency of double-digit spreads, reported in Table 7, remains well
below pre-1990 levels.

33. Albert J. Klumpp, Odd vs. Even: Is Low Retention Election Turnout a Function
of Odd-Year Scheduling? 35 PENN. LAWYER 18 (2013).
34. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT: 2009-2010 TO
THE LEGISLATURE AND SUPREME COURT (2011); ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TWENTYSIXTH REPORT: 2011-2012 TO THE LEGISLATURE AND SUPREME COURT (2013).
35. See generally Scott Greytak et al., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013-2014 1–4 (2015), https://www.brennancenter
.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Politics_of_Judicial_Election_2
013_2014.pdf.
36. See supra Table 2.
37. See supra Figure 1.
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Table 7. Double-Digit Spreads by Decade

pre-1970
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009
2010-2016

Candidates
688
1647
2513
3127
3568
2875

DoubleDigit
Spreads
18
102
118
111
91
97

Rate
2.62%
6.19%
4.70%
3.55%
2.55%
3.37%

Some of the credit for this stability certainly goes to the kinds of
counter-campaigns that were discussed at the May 2017 CLE program.
But campaign activities notwithstanding, the analysis presented here
shows that Alaska’s judges face a significant danger that judges in most
other states do not: low baseline approval rates that leave them at greater
risk of removal. And this danger is neither new nor nationwide, but rather
is long-established and Alaska-specific.
Alaska legal historian Pamela Cravez, writing about a prominent
territorial lawyer named Wendell Kay, shed some insight into the prestatehood attitude of Alaskans towards their legal system:
Kay, like many lawyers who came to Alaska while it was still a
territory, became an expert at appealing to community norms
over the law. Not surprising, since from the time of its purchase
in 1867 to statehood in 1959, Alaskans developed a great
skepticism of laws provided them . . . Alaska’s territorial
lawyers understood the gap between [what] laws provided
Alaskans and what their communities were willing to enforce.38
Cravez also described Anchorage juries of the 1940s as exhibiting
“an independence of spirit, their verdicts relying more on a lawyer’s
dramatic performance and appeal to pragmatism than on the letter of the
law.”39 These passages, although dealing with pre-statehood years,
suggest an electorate that would tend to be less friendly than others
towards the judicial system as an institution, and more receptive to
criticisms of the performance of judges.

38. PAMELA CRAVEZ, THE BIGGEST DAMNED HAT: TALES FROM ALASKA’S
TERRITORIAL LAWYERS AND JUDGES 1–2 (2017).
39. Id. at 88.
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That characterization is supported by the findings herein. As much
as Alaska has grown and changed since statehood, Alaska’s unusually
low level of baseline support for retention candidates indicates that the
same attitude towards the judiciary apparently remains at least to some
extent.
The purpose of this Article is definitely not to argue that any
particular judge should or should not be retained, or that a vote for or
against a retention candidate for whatever reason is right or wrong. But
to the extent that some Alaskans are concerned about the fate of judges
who prove themselves worthy of retention, this Article has shown that
addressing the significant, deep-rooted negative attitude in the state’s
electorate is every bit as important as the more empirical issues involved
in conducting judicial campaigns, and arguably more so. Particularly if
the state’s approval rates continue to slowly decline, retention candidates
viewed as “competent and qualified” will face a greater and greater risk
of being voted off the bench, either because of anti-retention campaigns
or as collateral damage from an anti-incumbent or scorched-earth protest
votes.
Very little is known about why voters support or oppose retention
candidates in general. In the absence of controversies that generate public
attention or significant campaign activity, retention elections tend to be
low-visibility affairs and the candidates remain largely or entirely
unknown to the voters who decide their fates. Any effort to address
Alaska’s low approval rates and improve the prospects for future
candidates should begin with an attempt to learn why voters choose
“yes” or “no” as their default vote when presented with an unfamiliar
name. A better understanding of this could substantially affect the
“changing national landscape” and improve the prospects of qualified
candidates in Alaska and every other retention state.

